On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games by Harks, Tobias & Klimm, Max
On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
in Weighted Congestion Games
Tobias Harks∗ Max Klimm∗†
December 7, 2010
Abstract
We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. LetC denote a set
of cost functions. We say thatC is consistentif every weighted congestion game with cost functions
in C possesses a pure Nash equilibrium. Our main contribution isa complete characterization of
consistency of cost functions. Specifically, we prove that anonempty setC of twice continuously
differentiable functions is consistent for two-player games ifand only ifC contains only monotonic
functions and for allc1, c2 ∈ C, there are constantsa, b ∈ R such thatc1(x) = a c2(x) + b for all
x ∈ R≥0. For games with at least 3 players, we prove thatC is consistent if and only if exactly one
of the following cases hold: (a)C contains only affine functions; (b)C contains only exponential
functions such thatc(x) = ac eφ x+bc for someac, bc, φ ∈ R, whereac andbc may depend onc, while
φ must be equal for everyc ∈ C. The latter characterization is even valid for 3-player games, thus,
closing the gap to 2-player games considered above. Finally, we derive several characterizations of
consistency of cost functions for games with restricted strategy spaces, such as games with singleton
strategies or weighted network congestion games.
1 Introduction
In many situations, the state of a system is determined by a finite number of independent players, each
optimizing an individual objective function. A natural framework for analyzing such decentralized sys-
tems are noncooperative games. While it is well known that for finite noncooperative games a Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies always exists, this need not be true for Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies (PNE for short). One of the fundamental goals in game theory is to characterize conditions under
which a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists. In this paper, we study this question for weighted
congestion games.
Congestion games, as introduced by Rosenthal [31], model the in eraction of a finite set of players
that compete over a finite set of facilities. A pure strategy of each player is a set of facilities. The cost
of facility f is given by a real-valued cost functioncf that depends on the number of players usingf
and the private cost of every player equals the sum of the costs of the facilities in the strategy that she
chooses. Rosenthal [31] proved in a seminal paper that such congestion games always admit a PNE by
showing these games posses an exact potential function. In aweightedcongestion game, every player
has a demandi ∈ R>0 that she places on the chosen facilities. The cost of a facility is then a function of
the total load on the facility. An important subclass of weighted congestion games are weightedn twork
congestion games. Here, every player is associated with a positive demand that she wants to route
from her origin to her destination on a path of minimum cost. In contrast to unweighted congestion
games, weighted congestion games do not always admit a PNE. Fotakis et al. [14] and Libman and
Orda [22] constructed a single-commodity network instancewith two players having demands one and
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two, respectively. Their instances use different non-decreasing cost values per edge that are defined at
the three possible loads 1, 2, 3. Goemans et al. [17] constructed a two-player single-commdity instance
without a PNE that uses different polynomial cost functions with nonnegative coefficients and degree
of at most two. Interestingly, Anshelevich et al. [5] showedthat for (strictly decreasing) cost functions
of the formcf (x) = c̄f /x, c̄f ≥ 0, every two-player game possesses a PNE. For games with affine cost
functions, Fotakis et al. [14, 15] proved that every weighted congestion game possesses a PNE. Later
Panagopoulou and Spirakis [29] proved that PNE always existfor instances with uniform exponential
cost functions (cf (x) = ex). Harks et al. [19] generalized this existence result to non-uniform exponential
cost functions of the formcf (x) = af eφ x + bf for someaf , bf , φ ∈ R, whereaf andbf may depend
on the facility f , while φ must be equal for every facility. It is worth noting that the positive results
of [14, 15, 19, 29] are particularly important as they establish existence of PNE for the respective sets
of cost functionsindependentof the underlying game structure, that is,independentof the underlying
strategy set, demand vector, and number of players, respectively.
In this paper, we further explore the equilibrium existenceproblem in weighted congestion games.
Our goal is to precisely characterize, which type of cost functio s actually guarantees the existence of
PNE. To formally capture this issue, we introduce the notionof PNE-consistencyor simplyconsistency
of a set of cost functions. LetC be a set of cost functions and letG(C) be the set ofall weighted conges-
tion games with cost functions inC. We say thatC is consistentif every game inG(C) possesses a PNE.
Accordingly, we say thatC is FIP-consistent, if every game inG(C) possesses the Finite Improvement
Property, that is, every sequence of unilateral improvements is finite, see Monderer and Shapley [27].
Using this terminology, the results of [14,15,19,29] yieldthatC is consistent ifC contains either affine
functions or certain exponential functions. A natural openquestion is to decide whether there are fur-
ther consistent functions, that is, functions guaranteeing the existence of a PNE. We thus investigate the
following question: How large is the setC of consistent cost functions?
1.1 Our results
In order to obtain a complete characterization of the equilibrium existence problem in weighted conges-
tion games, we first derive necessary conditions. LetC be a set of continuous functions. We show that
if C is consistent, thenC may only contain monotonic functions. We further show that monotonicity
of cost functions is necessary for consistency even in singleton games, two-player games, two-facility
games, games with identical cost functions and games with symmetric strategies. Assuming thatC con-
tains twice continuously differentiable functions we obtain as our first main result thatC is consistent
for two-player games if and only ifC contains only monotonic functions and for allc1, c2 ∈ C, there are
constantsa, b ∈ R such thatc1(x) = a c2(x) + b for all x ∈ R≥0. This characterization precisely explains
the seeming dichotomy between the positive result of Anshelevich et al. [5] for two-player games and
the two-player instances without PNE given by [14, 17, 22]. Our second main result establishes a char-
acterization for the general case. We prove thatC is consistent for games with at least 3 players if and
only if exactly one of the following cases hold: (a)C contains only affine functions; (b)C contains only
exponential functions such thatc(x) = ac eφ x + bc for someac, bc, φ ∈ R, whereac andbc may depend
onc, whileφmust be equal for everyc ∈ C. This characterization is even valid for 3-player games, thus,
closing the gap to 2-player games considered above. We further show that in both cases, consistency of
C is equivalent to FIP-consistency.
While the above characterizations hold forarbitrary strategy spaces, we also study consistency of
cost functions forestrictedstrategy spaces. For singleton weighted congestion games with two players
we show thatC is consistent if and only ifC contains only monotonic functions. This characterization
does not extend to games with three players. We give an instance with three players and monotonic cost
functions without a PNE. For symmetric singleton weighted congestion games, however, we prove that
C is consistent if and only ifC contains only monotonic functions. Both characterizations do not require
differentiability assumptions on the set of cost functions. Moreover, as a by-product of our analysis,
we obtain a polynomial time algorithm computing a PNE for two-player singleton games and symmet-
ric singleton games provided that cost functions are monotonic. In contrast to the characterizations
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for arbitrary strategy spaces, both characterizations do not carry over to FIP-consistency. We provide
corresponding instances with improvement cycles.
Finally, we study weighted network congestion games. LetC be a non-empty set of strictly increas-
ing, positive, and twice continuously differentiable functions. For multi-commodity networks with at
least three players, we show thatC is consistent if and only ifC contains only affine functions or certain
exponential functions as specified above. For two-player network games (single or two-commodity net-
works), we show thatC is consistent if and only if for allc1, c2 ∈ C, there are constantsa, b ∈ R such
thatc1(x) = a c2(x)+b for all x ∈ R≥0. For single-commodity network games with at least three players,
we prove thatC is FIP-consistent if and only ifC contains only affine functions or certain exponential
functions.
1.2 Techniques and Outline of the Paper
The proofs of our main results essentially rely on two ingredients. First, we derive in Section 3 for
continuous and consistent cost functions two necessary conditions (Monotonicity Lemma and Extended
Monotonicity Lemma). The Monotonicity Lemma states that any continuous and consistent cost func-
tion must be monotonic. The Lemma is proved by constructing atwo-player weighted congestion game
in which we identify a unique 4-cycle of deviations of two players. Then, we show that for any non-
monotonic cost function, there is a weighted congestion game with a unique improvement cycle. By
adding additional players and carefully choosing player-wights and strategy spaces, we then derive
the Extended Monotonicity Lemma, which ensures that the setof cost functions contained in a certain
finite integer linear hullof the considered cost functions must be monotone. In Section 4, we give a
characterization of the set of functions that arise from affine transformations of a monotonic function.
Then, we show that the Extended Monotonicity Lemma for two-player games implies that consistent
cost functions must be of this form. In Section 5, we give a characterization for affine and exponential
functions, and show that the Extended Monotonicity Lemma for games with at least three players im-
plies that consistent cost functions must be either affine or exponential. In Section 6 and Section 7, we
derive characterizations of consistency and FIP-consistency of cost functions for games with restricted
strategy spaces, such as weighted singleton congestion games and weighted network congestion games,
respectively.
1.3 Significance
Weighted congestion games are among the core topics in the gam theory, operations research, com-
puter science and economics literature. This class of gameshas everal applications such as scheduling
games, routing games, facility location games, network design games, etc. see [1, 5, 9, 16, 21, 25]. In
all of the above applications there are two fundamental goals from a system design perspective: (i) the
system must bestabilizable, that is, there must exist a stable point (PNE) from which no player wants
to unilaterally deviate; (ii ) myopic play of the players should guide the system to astablestate. Be-
cause the number of players and their types (expressed by thedemands and the strategy spaces) are only
known to the players and not available to the system designer, it is very natural to study the above two
issues with respect to the usedcost functions. In fact, in most of the above mentioned applications, the
cost functions are under control of the system designer since they represent the technology associated
with the resources, e.g., queuing discipline at routers, latency function in transportation networks, etc.
Therefore, our results may help to predict and explain unstable traffic distributions in telecommunication
networks and road networks. For instance in telecommunication networks, relevant cost functions are
the so-calledM/M/1-delay functions (see also [34]). These functions are of the ormca(x) = 1/(ua− x),
whereua represents the capacity of arca. In road networks, for instance, the most frequently used
functions are monomials of degree 4 put forward by the U.S. Burea of Public Roads [8]. Our results
imply, that for these special types of cost functions, thereis alwaysa multi-commodity instance (with
3 players, two-commodities and identical cost functions) that is unstable in the sense that a PNE does
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not exist. On the other hand, our characterizations can be used to design a stable system: for instance,
uniform M/M/1-delay functions are consistent for two-player games.
Our results are also relevant for the large body of work quantifyi g the worst-case efficiency loss of
PNE for different sets of cost functions, see Awerbuch et al. [6], Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [10],
and Aland et al. [3]. While mixed Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, their use is unrealistic in
practice. On the other hand, our work reveals that for most cla ses of cost functions pure Nash equilibria
as the stronger solution concept may fail to exist in weighted congestion games. Thus, our work provides
additional justification to study the worst-case efficiency loss for different solution concepts, such as sink
equilibria [17], correlated and coarse correlated equilibria [33].
1.4 Related Work
In contrast to ordinary congestion games as introduced by Rosenthal [31], games with weighted players
and/or player-specific cost functions need not possess a PNE. As for weighted players, even two-players
games may fail to admit a PNE, see the examples given by Fotakis et al. [14], Goemans et al. [17] and
Libman and Orda [22]. Also related is the early work of Rosenthal [32] who showed that in weighted
congestion games where players are allowed to split their demand integrally, a PNE need not exist.
On the positive side, Fotakis et al. [14] and Panagopoulou and Spirakis [29] proved the existence of a
PNE in games with affine and exponential costs, respectively. Dunkel and Schulz [11] showed that it
is strongly NP-hard to decide whether or not a weighted congestion game with nonlinear cost functions
possesses a PNE. If the strategy of every player contains a sigle facility only (singleton games), Fotakis
et al. [13] showed the existence of PNE for special strictly increasing cost functions. Even-Dar et al. [12]
derived the existence of PNE for load balancing games on parallel unrelated machines. Andelman
et at [4] proved even the existence of a strong Nash equilibrim - a strengthening of the pure Nash
equilibrium to resilience against coalitional deviations- in scheduling games on unrelated machines. In
fact, strong Nash equilibria exist in all singleton weighted congestion games with non-decreasing costs,
see Harks et al. [20]. This holds as well for the case of non-increasing cost functions as proven by
Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [35]. Allowing for player-specific cost functions, Milchtaich [23] showed
that unweighted singleton congestion games with player-spcific cost functions possess at least one
PNE. He also presented an instance with weighted players andpl yer-specific cost functions without
a PNE. Gairing et al. [16] showed that best response dynamicsdo not cycle if the player-specific cost
functions are linear without a constant term. Milchtaich [25] further showed that general network games
with player-specific costs need not admit a PNE in general. Infact, the corresponding decision problem
turns out to be NP-complete, as shown by Ackermann and Skopali [2]. Ieong et al. [21] proved that in
congestion games with singleton strategies and non-decreasing cost functions, best response dynamics
converge in polynomial time to a PNE. Ackermann et al. [1] extended this result to weighted congestion
games with a so calledmatroid property, that is, the strategy of every player forms a basis of a matroid.
In the same paper, they showed that the matroid property is the maximal property that gives rise to a PNE
for all non-decreasing cost functions, that is, for any strategy space not satisfying the matroid property,
there is an instance of a weighted congestion game not havingPNE. The consistency approach that we
pursue in this paper is orthogonal to that of Ackermann et al.[1]. While they characterize the structure of
the strategy space guaranteeing the existence of a PNE assuming arbitrary positive and non-decreasing
costs, we characterize the structure of cost functions guaranteeing the existence of a PNE assuming
arbitrary strategy spaces. Orda et al. [28] study the issue of uniqueness of PNE in weighted network
congestion games with splittable demands (see also Fleischer et al. [7], Milchtaich [24], Richman and
Shimkin [30] and Yang and Zhang [36]). They give sufficient conditions for uniqueness of PNE for
several classes of cost functions. Interestingly, in the final section of their paper, the authors raise the
issue about the existence of pure Nash equilibria in such games (depending on the cost functions) under
the assumption that the flow is unsplittable. The results in this paper give a complete answer to their
question.
An extended abstract of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 37th International Colloquium
on Automata, Languages and Programming, 2010, see [18].
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2 Preliminaries
We consider finite strategic gamesG = (N,S, π), whereN = {1, . . . , n} is the non-empty and finite set
of players,S =

i∈N Si is the non-empty strategy space, andπ : S → Rn is the combinedprivate
cost function that assigns a private cost vectorπ(s) to each strategy profiles ∈ S. We consider cost
minimization games and (unless specified otherwise) we allow private cost functions to be negative or
positive. We will call an elements ∈ S strategy profile. Fori ∈ N, we write S−i =

j,i S j and
s = (si , s−i) meaning thatsi ∈ Si ands−i ∈ S−i . A strategy profiles is apure Nash equilibrium (PNE)
if πi(s) ≤ πi(ti , s−i) for all i ∈ N and ti ∈ Si. A pair
(
s, (ti , s−i)
) ∈ S × S is called animproving move
(or profitable deviation) of player i if πi(si , s−i) > πi(ti , s−i). We call a sequence of strategy profiles
γ = (s1, s2, . . . ) an improvement pathif for every k the tuple (sk, sk+1) is an improving move. A closed
path (s1, . . . , sl , s1) will be referred to as anl-improvement cycle. A game has theFinite Improvement
Property (FIP)if no such cycle exists. A functionP : S→ R with P(s) > P(t) for all improving moves
(s, t) is calledpotential function. As noticed by Monderer and Shapley [27], every game that admits a
potential function has the FIP and every finite game with the FIP possesses a PNE.
A tupleM = (N, F,S =i∈N Si , (cf ) f∈F) is called acongestion model, whereN is the set of players,
F is a non-empty, finite set of facilities and for each playeri ∈ N, her collection of pure strategiesSi is
a non-empty, finite set of subsets ofF. A cost functioncf : R≥0 → R is associated with every facility
f ∈ F. In contrast to most previous works, we do neither assume monotonicity nor positivity of costs.
In the following, we will define weighted congestion games similar to Goemans et al. [17].
Definition 2.1 (Weighted congestion game). LetM = (N, F,S, (cf ) f∈F) be a congestion model and
(di)i∈N be a vector of demands withdi ∈ R>0. The correspondingweighted congestion gameis the







ℓ f (s) =
∑
j∈N: f∈sj d j .
We will sometimes writeG instead ofG(M). Let C be a set of cost functions and letG(C) be the
set of all weighted congestion games with cost functions inC. Then, we say thatC is consistentif every
G ∈ G(C) admits a PNE; we callC FIP-consistentif every G ∈ G(C) has the FIP. If the setG(C) is
restricted, for instance to two player games etc., we say that C is consistent forG(C) if everyG ∈ G(C)
possesses a PNE.
3 Necessary Conditions on the Existence of a PNE
Throughout this work, we will assume thatC is a set of continuous functions. As a first result, we prove
that ifC is consistent, then every functionc ∈ C is monotonic. We will first need a technical lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let c : R≥0 → R be a continuous function. Then, the following two statements are
equivalent:
1. c is monotonic onR≥0.
2. The following two conditions hold:
(a) For all x ∈ R>0 with c(x) > c(0) there isǫ > 0 such that c(y) ≥ c(x) for all y ∈ (x, x+ ǫ).
(b) For all x ∈ R>0 with c(x) < c(0) there isǫ > 0 such that c(y) ≤ c(x) for all y ∈ (x, x+ ǫ).
Proof. 1⇒ 2 Trivial.
¬1 ⇒ ¬2. If c is not monotonic we can findp1, p2, p3 ∈ R>0 such thatp1 < p2 < p3 and either
c(p1) < c(p2) > c(p3) or c(p1) > c(p2) < c(p3). As c is continuous we may assume without loss of
generality thatc(p1) , c(0). Now letδ > 0 be such thatc(y) , c(0) for all y ∈ [p1, p1 + δ] and consider
the compact interval [p1 + δ, p3]. The sets{(x, x + ǫ) : x ∈ [p1, p3]}, whereǫ is chosen as in 2, are an














Figure 1: As shown in Lemma 3.1, for every continuous non-monot ic function there arex, y ∈ R>0
such that one of the following cases holds: (a)c(y− x) < c(y) < c(x); (b) c(y− x) > c(y) > c(x).
assume without loss of generality thatc(x1) > c(0). This implies thatc(y) ≥ c(x1) for all y ∈ (x1, x1+ ǫ).
In particular,x2 ∈ (x1, x1 + ǫ) and, thus,c(x2) > c(0). We obtain thatc(y) ≥ c(x2) ≥ c(x1) ≥ c(0) for all
y ∈ (x2, x2 + ǫ). Iterating this argument up toxk and regarding the limitδ → 0 delivers a contradiction
to c(p1) < c(p2) > c(p3) or c(p1) > c(p2) < c(p3). 
Lemma 3.1 establishes that for every continuous and non-monotonic functionc, there isx > 0 such
that one of the following holds:(a) c(x) > c(0) and for everyǫ > 0 there isy with 0 < y − x < ǫ such
thatc(y) < c(x); (b) c(x) < c(0) and for everyǫ > 0 there isy with 0 < y− x < ǫ such thatc(y) > c(x).
Because of the continuity ofc, asǫ → 0, we havec(y− x)→ c(0) andc(y)→ c(x). This implies that for
sufficiently smallǫ, we can findy ∈ (x, x+ ǫ) such that one of the following inequalities holds
(a) c(y− x) < c(y) < c(x), (b) c(y− x) > c(y) > c(x). (1)
These two cases are depicted in Figure 1. Now consider a facility f with a non-monotonic cost function
and two players with demandsd1 = y − x andd2 = x, wherex andy are as in (1). Clearly, in case
(1a) player 1 prefers to be alone onf while player 2 would like to share the facility with player 1.If
(1b) holds, the argumentation works the other way round. This observation is the key to construct a
two-player weighted congestion game with singleton strategies that does not admit a PNE.
Lemma 3.2 (Monotonicity Lemma). Let C be a set of continuous functions. IfC is consistent, then
every c∈ C is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose thatc ∈ C is a non-monotonic function and consider the congestion model M =
(N, F,S, (cf ) f∈F) with N = {1, 2}, F = { f , g}, S1 = S2 =
{{ f }, {g}}, cf = cg = c. Sincec is non-
monotonic, by Lemma 3.1 we can findx, y ∈ R>0 such that either (1a) or (1b) holds. Regard the game
G(M) with d1 = y − x andd2 = x. Calculating the differences of the deviating players’ private costs
along the 4-cycleγ =
(({ f }, { f }), ({g}, { f }), ({g}, {g}), ({ f }, {g}), ({ f }, { f })
)
, we obtain
π1({g}, { f }) − π1({ f }, { f }) = (y− x)
(
c(y− x) − c(y)), π1({ f }, {g}) − π1({g}, {g}) = (y− x)
(
c(y− x) − c(x)),
(2)
π2({g}, {g}) − π2({g}, { f }) = x
(
c(y) − c(x)), π2({ f }, { f }) − π2({ f }, {g}) = x
(
c(y) − c(x)). (3)
If (1a) holds, the differences (2)-(3) are positive andγ is an improvement cycle. In case that (1b) is
valid, we can reverse the direction ofγ and still get an improvement cycle. Using that every strategy
combination is contained inγ, the claimed result follows. 
Besides the continuity of the functions inC, the proof of Lemma 3.2 relies on rather mild assump-
tions and, thus, this result can be strengthened in the following way.
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Corollary 3.3. LetC be a set of continuous functions. LetG(C) be the set of weighted congestion games
with cost functions inC satisfying one or more of the following properties: (i) Eachgame G∈ G(C) has
two players; (ii) Each game G∈ G(C) has two facilities; (iii) For each game G∈ G(C) and each player
i ∈ N, the set of her strategies Si contains a single facility only; (iv) Each game G∈ G(C) has symmetric
strategies; (v) Cost functions are identical, that is, cf = cg for all f , g ∈ F. If C is consistent forG(C),
then, each c∈ Cmust be monotonic.
We now extend the Monotonicity Lemma to obtain an even stronger result by regarding more players
and more complex strategies. To this end, forK ∈ N we consider those functions that can be written
as the integral linear combination ofK functions inC, possibly with an offset. Formally, we define the
finite integer linear hullof C as
LZ(C) =
{
c : R≥0→ R : c(x) =
K∑
k=1
ak ck(x+ bk) : K ∈ N, ak ∈ Z, bk ∈ R≥0, ck ∈ C
}
, (4)
and show that consistency ofC implies thatLZ(C) contains only monotonic functions.
Lemma 3.4(Extended Monotonicity Lemma). LetC be an arbitrary set of continuous functions. IfC is
consistent, thenLZ(C) contains only monotonic functions.
Proof. Let c ∈ LZ(C) be arbitrary. By allowingck = cl for k , l, we can omit the integer coefficientsak
and rewritec asc(x) =
∑m+
k=1 ck(x+ bk) −
∑m−
k=1 c̄k(x+ b̄k) for someck, c̄k ∈ C,m+,m− ∈ N.
We define the congestion modelM = (N, F,S, (cf ) f∈F), whereN = Np ∪ N+ ∪ N− and F =
F1∪F2∪F3∪F4. The set of playersN+ contains for eachck, 1≤ k ≤ m+, a player with demandbk and
the set of playersN− contains for each ¯ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ m−, a player with demand̄bk. We call the players in
N− ∪ N+ offsetplayers. The setNp = {1, 2} contains two additional (non-trivial) players. Offset players
with demand equal to 0 can be removed from the game. For ease ofexp sition, we assume that all offsets
bk, k = 1 . . . ,m+ andb̄k, k = 1, . . . ,m− are strictly positive.
We now explain the strategy spaces and the setsF1, F2, F3, F4. For each functionck, 1 ≤ k ≤ m+,
we introduce two facilitiesf 2k , f
3
k with cost functionck. For each function ¯ck, 1 ≤ k ≤ m−, we introduce
two facilities f 1k , f
4
k with cost function ¯ck. To model the offsetsbk in (4), for each offset playerk ∈ N
+,
we defineSk = { f 2k , f
3
k }. Similarly, for each offset playerk ∈ N
−, we setSk = { f 1k , f
4
k }. The non-trivial
players inNp have strategiesS1 = {F1 ∪ F2, F3 ∪ F4} andS2 = {F1 ∪ F3, F2 ∪ F4}, where
F1 =
{
























Having defined the congestion model, we consider a series of weighted congestion gamesGx
δ
(M)
with d1 = δ andd2 = x for 1, 2 ∈ Np. For the 4-cycle
γ =
((
F1 ∪ F2, F1 ∪ F3, . . . ), (F3 ∪ F4, F1 ∪ F3, . . . ), (F3 ∪ F4, F2 ∪ F4, . . . ),
(
F1 ∪ F2, F2 ∪ F4, . . . ), (F1 ∪ F2, F1 ∪ F3, . . . )
)
,






F3 ∪ F4, F1 ∪ F3, . . . ) − π1
(





ck(d1 + d2 + bk) −
m−∑
k=1
c̄k(d1 + d2 + b̄k) +
m−∑
k=1
c̄k(d1 + b̄k) −
m+∑
k=1








F3 ∪ F4, F2 ∪ F4, . . . ) − π2
(





ck(d1 + d2 + bk) +
m−∑
k=1
c̄k(d1 + d2 + b̄k) +
m+∑
k=1
ck(d2 + bk) −
m−∑
k=1






F1 ∪ F2, F2 ∪ F4, . . . ) − π1
(





ck(d1 + d2 + bk) −
m−∑
k=1
c̄k(d1 + d2 + b̄k) +
m−∑
k=1
c̄k(d1 + b̄k) −
m+∑
k=1







F1 ∪ F2, F1 ∪ F3, . . . ) − π2
(





ck(d1 + d2 + bk) +
m−∑
k=1
c̄k(d1 + d2 + b̄k) −
m−∑
k=1
c̄k(d2 + b̄k) +
m+∑
k=1
ck(d2 + bk) = c(x) − c(x+ δ).
If c(x) < c(0), we can findǫ > 0 such thatc(x + δ) < c(δ) for all 0 < δ < ǫ. For suchδ, the values
in (5) and (6) are negative and we may conclude that there is anmprovement cycle in the gameG if
c(x) < c(x+ δ). Hence, we havec(x) ≥ c(y) for all y ∈ (x, x+ ǫ).
If c(0) > c(x), considering the 4-cycle in the other direction yields theclaimed result by the same
argumentation. Using that every strategy combination is contained inγ, applying Lemma 3.1 delivers
the claimed result. 
4 A Characterization for Two-Player Games
We will analyze implications of the Extended Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 3.4) for two-player weighted
congestion games. First, we remark that if all offsetsbk andb̄k in (4) are equal to zero, the construction
in Lemma 3.4 only involves two players. For ease of exposition, we additionally restrict ourselves to the
caseK = 2, that is, we only regard those functions that can be writtenas an integral linear combination
of two functions inC without offset. Formally, define
L2Z(C) = {c : R≥0→ R : c(x) = a1 c1(x) + a2 c2(x), a1, a2 ∈ Z, c1, c2 ∈ C} ⊆ LZ(C).
We obtain the following immediate corollary of the ExtendedMonotonicity Lemma.
Corollary 4.1. LetC be an arbitrary set of continuous functions. IfC is consistent for two-player games,
then,L2
Z
(C) contains only monotonic functions.
Thus, we will proceed investigating sets of functionsC that guarantee thatL2
Z
(C) contains only
monotonic functions. For this purpose, we show the following technical lemma.




(C) contains only monotonic functions.
2. For all c1, c2 ∈ C there are a, b ∈ R such that c2(x) = a c1(x) + b for all x ≥ 0.
Proof. 2⇒ 1: Calculus.
1⇒ 2:


















Figure 2: Illustration of a generic monotonic function usedin the second step of the proof of Lemma 4.2.
To this end, assume that (7) does not hold, that is, we can findc1, c2 ∈ C andx0 > 0, such thatD(x0) , 0.
As D is continuous, there isǫ > 0 such thatD(x) , 0 for all x ∈ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ). Now assume that




2 (x) = 0 for all x ∈ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ)
contradictingD(x) , 0 for all x ∈ (x− ǫ, x+ ǫ) and we derive that there isx1 ∈ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ) such that
c′2(x1) , 0. Using thatc
′
2 is continuous we can findδ > 0 such that (x1 − δ, x1 + δ) ⊆ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ) and
c′2(x) , 0 for all x ∈ (x1 − δ, x1 + δ).


































As a2(x) is continuous and non-constant, we can findx ∈ (x1 − δ, x1 + δ) such thata2(x) ∈ Q and,
thus, we can writea2(x) =
p
q for somep, q ∈ Z. Choosinga1 = q, a2 = p it follows that the function
a1 c1(x) + a2 c2(x) ∈ L2Z(C) has a strict local extremum atx.
Second step: We show that (7) implies 2.
As c′1(x) is continuous there are disjoint closed intervalsI1 = [α1, ω1], I2 = [α2, ω2], . . . such that
c′1(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Ik, k = 1, 2, . . . andc
′
2(x) , 0 for all x ∈ R>0 \
⋃
k Ik. For an illustration of this fact,
see Figure 2. Note that we also allow the caseI1 = (0, ω1] becausec′1(x) is not defined forx = 0.
Now, consider an intervalJk = (ωk, αk+1) with the property thatc′1(x) , 0 for all x ∈ Jk. AsD(x) = 0,
we obtain (c′2(x) / c
′
1(x))
′ = 0 for all x ∈ Jk implying c′2(x) = a c
′
1(x) for some constanta. Integration
then deliversc2(x) = a c1(x) + b for some constantsa, b and allx ∈ Jk.
We claim thatc′2(x) = 0 for all Ik, k = 1, 2 . . . . To see this, suppose that there isk uch thatc2(x) is
not constant onIk, that is, there isx0 ∈ Ik such thatc′2(x0) , 0. Using thatc
′
2 is continuous we can find
ǫ > 0 such thatc′2(x) , 0 for all (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ) ⊂ Ik. The same line of argumentation as above then
delivers thatc1(x) = a c2(x) + b for all x ∈ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ) ⊂ Ik contradicting the assumption thatc1 is
constant onIk.
Consider two arbitrary intervalsJk = (ωk, αk+1), Jl = (ωl , αl+1) with c′1(x) , 0, c
′
2(x) , 0 for all
x ∈ Jk ∪ Jl. So far, we have shown that there are constantsk, bk, al , bl , with c2(x) = ak c1(x) + bk
for all x ∈ Jk andc2(x) = al c1(x) + bl for all x ∈ Jl . It is left to show that there areglobal constants
a, b, such thatc2(x) = a c1(x) + b for all x ≥ 0. For contradiction, assume thatk , al for somek, l
with αk < αl. This implies that we can findp, q ∈ Z such thatq + p ak < 0 < q + p al . We obtain




1(x)(q + p ak) for all x ∈ Jk, while q c
′




1(x)(q + p al) for all x ∈ Jl .




2(x) has different signs onJk
andJl establishing that ˜c(x) = q c1(x)+ p c2(x) ∈ L2Z(C) has a local extremum in [ωk+1, αl] contradicting
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our assumption. Thus, we conclude thatak = al . Given this, continuity ofc1, c2 implies bk = bl and
c2(x) = a c1(x) + b for somea, b ∈ R and allx ≥ 0. 
We are now ready to prove our first main result.
Theorem 4.3. Let C be a set of twice continuously differentiable functions. LetG2(C) be the set of
two-player games such that cost functions are inC. Then, the following two conditions are equivalent.
1. C is consistent forG2(C).
2. C contains only monotonic functions and for all c1, 2 ∈ C, there are constants a, b ∈ R such that
c1(x) = a c2(x) + b for all x ∈ R≥0.
Proof. 1⇒ 2: Using Corollary 4.1 we get thatL2
Z
(C) contains only monotonic functions. Applying
Lemma 4.2 then yields the result.
2⇒ 1: LetC be as specified in 2 and letc ∈ C be arbitrary. Consider the setC̄ = {a c(x)+b : a, b ∈ R}.
We will show thatC̄ is consistent forG2(C̄). To this end, consider an arbitrary two-player game with
costs inC̄ and demandsd1 < d2. We distinguish the following three cases.
First case:c(d1) < c(d2) < c(d1 + d2), or c(d1) > c(d2) > c(d1 + d2). Sincec is strictly monotonic
with respect to the pointsd1, d2 andd1 + d2, there is a strictly monotonic function ˜c with c̃(d1) = c(d1),
c̃(d2) = c(d2) and c̃(d1 + d2) = c(d1 + d2). Consequently, we can replace every cost functionc ∈ C̄ =
{a c(x) + b : a, b ∈ R} by a cost function ˜c ∈ C̃ = {ac̃(x) + b : a, b ∈ R} without changing the players’
private costs. As shown by Harks et a. [19], for any strictly monotonic function ˜c, every weighted
congestion gameG with cost functions inC̄ = {ac̃(x) + b : a, b ∈ R} admits a potential function and,
thus, has the FIP and possesses a PNE.
Second case:c(d1) = c(d2) , c(d1+d2). We setd̃1 = d̃2 = 1 and chose for every facilityf ∈ F a new
cost function ˜cf with c̃f (1) = cf (d1) = cf (d2) andc̃f (2) = cf (d1 + d2). By construction, the unweighted
congestion game with demands1̃, d̃2 and costs (˜cf ) f∈F has the same private costs as the original game.
Rosenthal [31] showed the existence of a potential functionin all unweighted congestion form which
the FIP and the existence of a PNE can be derived.
Third case: c(d1) , c(d2) = c(d1 + d2). We have ¯c(d1) , c̄(d2) = c̄(d1 + d2) for all c̄ ∈ C̄
and thus Player 2 is always indifferent whether Player 1 shares a facility with her or not. For the FIP
and the existence of a PNE, we argue as follows: Consider the vector valued functionφ : S → R,
s 7→ (π2(s), π1(s)) which assigns to every strategy profile the vector which has t e private cost of players
2 and 1 in first and second component respectively. We claim that φ decreases lexicographically along
any improvement path. This is trivial for improvement movesof player 2. Since player 2 is indifferent
whether player 1 shares with her a facility or not, every improvement move of player 1 does not affect the
private cost of player 2 but decreases the private cost of player 1. This implies that the lexicographical
order ofφ(s) decreases along any improvement path, thus, every such path is finite. 
We now turn to FIP-consistency of cost functions in two-player games. Since FIP-consistency im-
plies consistency, we obtain the same necessary conditionsfor FIP-consistency ofC as established in
Theorem 4.3. Using that the proof of Theorem 4.3 uses potential function arguments, we get the follow-
ing immediate corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Let C be a set of twice continuously differentiable functions. LetG2(C) be the set of
two-player games such that cost functions are inC. Then, the following three conditions are equivalent.
1. C is consistent forG2(C).
2. C is FIP-consistent forG2(C).
3. C contains only monotonic functions and for all c1, 2 ∈ C, there are constants a, b ∈ R such that
c1(x) = a c2(x) + b for all x ∈ R≥0.
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5 A Characterization for the General Case
We now consider the casen ≥ 3, that is, we consider weighted congestion games with at leas three
players. We will show that a set of twice continuously differentiable cost functions is consistent if and
only if this set contains either linear or certain exponential functions. Our main tool for proving this
result is to analyze implications of the Extended Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 3.4) for three-player
weighted congestion games. Formally, define
L3Z(C) = {c : R≥0→ R : c(x) = a1 c1(x) + a2 c1(x+ b) : a1, a2 ∈ Z, c1 ∈ C, b ∈ R>0} ⊆ LZ(C).
Then, we obtain the following immediate corollary of the Extended Monotonicity Lemma.
Corollary 5.1. Let C be an arbitrary set of continuous functions. IfC is consistent for three-player
games, thenL3
Z
(C) contains only monotonic functions.
Note thatL3
Z
(C) involves an offsetb, which requires only three players in the construction of the
proof of the Extended Monotonicity Lemma. In order to characterize the sets of functionsC such that
L3
Z
(C) contains only monotonic functions, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Let c : R≥0 → R be a twice continuously differentiable function. Then, the following two
are equivalent:






= 0 for all x, y ∈ R≥0.
Proof. 1⇒ 2: Calculus.
2⇒ 1: If c′′(x) = 0 for all x ≥ 0, then,c is affine and 1 follows. So we may assume that there are
x0 > 0, ǫ > 0, such thatc′′(y) , 0 for all y ∈ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ). Hence, the functionc′(y) is not constant
on (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ) implying that we can findy ∈ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ) such thatc′(y) , 0. Using 2, we obtain
c′′(x)−(c′′(y) / c′(y)) c′(x) = 0 for all x ≥ 0. The unique solution of the above differential equation equals
c(x) = C1 ec
′′(y)/c′(y) +C2, whereC1,C2 ∈ R are constants, which establishes thatc is exponential. 
We are now ready to state our second main theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Let C be a non-empty set of twice continuously differentiable functions. Then,C is
consistent if and only if one of the following cases holds
1. C contains only affine functions.
2. C contains only functions of type c(x) = ac eφ x+bc where ac, bc ∈ Rmay depend on c whileφ ∈ R
is independent of c.
Proof. A set of cost functions, which is either affine or exponential (as specified in 1 and 2) is consis-
tent, because every weighted congestion games with such cost functions possesses a weighted potential,
see [14,19,29].
For proving the ”only if” direction, we use the Extended Monotonicity Lemma 3.4 stating that
consistency ofC implies thatL3
Z
(C) may only contain monotonic functions. For contradiction,assume
thatC is consistent butc ∈ C is neither affine nor exponential. Referring to Lemma 5.2 this implies that
there arex0, y0 ∈ R>0 with






Moreover, sincec′, c′′ and, hence, the mapping det(·, ·) : R≥0×R≥0→ R, (x, y) 7→ D(x, y) is continuous,
there isǫ > 0 such thatD(x, y) , 0 for all x ∈ (x0− ǫ, x0+ ǫ) andy ∈ (y0− ǫ, y0+ ǫ). In particular, we can
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choose ˜x ∈ (x0 − ǫ, x0 + ǫ) andỹ ∈ (y0 − ǫ, y0 + ǫ) with D(x̃, ỹ) , 0 andc′(x̃), c′(ỹ) ∈ Q. Consequently,
there area1, a2 ∈ Z such thata1 c′(x̃) + a2 c′(ỹ) = 0. We claim thata1 c′′(x̃) + a2 c′′(ỹ) , 0. To see this,













admits only the trivial solution (0, 0). Without loss of generality, let ˜x < ỹ. Then, the function ˜c : R≥0→
R defined as ˜c(x) = a1 c(x) + a2 c(x+ ỹ− x̃) ∈ L3Z has a local extremum forx = x̃, which contradicts the
consistency ofC.
We have established that everyc ∈ C is either affine or exponential. Referring to Theorem 4.3, it is
necessary that for two cost functionsc1, c2 ∈ C there area, b ∈ R such thatc1(x) = a c2(x) + b for all
x ≥ 0. We derive that eitherC contains only affine functions orC contains only exponential functions
c(x) = ac eφ x + bc for someac, bc, φ ∈ R whereφ is a common constant of allc ∈ C. 
Harks et al. [19] showed games with affine or exponential costs as in Theorem 5.3 admit a potential.
Thus, we obtain the following result as a corollary of Theorem 5.3.
Corollary 5.4. LetC be a non-empty set of twice continuously differentiable functions. Then, the fol-
lowing three are equivalent:
1. C is consistent.
2. C is FIP-consistent.
3. C contains only affine functionsor C contains only functions of type c(x) = ac eφ x + bc where
ac, bc ∈ Rmay depend on c whileφ ∈ R is independent of c.
We conclude this section by giving an example that illustrates the main ideas presented so far. Recall,
that Theorem 5.3 establishes that for each non-affi e and non-exponential cost functionc, there is a
weighted congestion gameG with uniform cost functionc on all facilities that does not admit a PNE. In
the following example, we show how such game forc(x) = x3 is constructed.
Example 5.5. As the function c(x) = x3 is neither affine nor exponential, there are a1, a2 ∈ Z and
b ∈ R>0 such thatc̃(x) = a1 c(x) + a2 c(x + b) has a strict local extremum. In fact, we can choose
a1 = 2, a2 = −1 and b = 1, that is, the functioñc(x) = 2c(x) − c(x + 1) = 2x3 − (x + 1)3q has a
strict local minimum at x0 = 1 +
√
2. In particular, we can choose d1 = 1 and d2 = 2 such that
c̃(d1) = −6 > c̃(d2) = −11 < c̃(d1 + d2) = −10. The weighted congestion game without PNE is
now constructed as follows: We introduce2(|a1| + |a2|) facilities f1, . . . , f6 and the following strategies
xa1 = { f1, f2, f3}, x
b
1 = { f4, f5, f6}, x
a
2 = { f1, f2, f4}, x
b
2 = { f3, f5. f6}, and x3 = { f3, f4}. We then set
S1 = {sa1, s
b



















2, s3). As Player3 is an offset player, she has a single strategy
only, thus, the players’ private costs depend only on the choice f Players 1 and 2 as indicated in the
table on the right. We derive that the4-cycleγ depicted on the right is a best-reply cycle in G. As there
are no strategy profiles outsideγ we conclude that G has no PNE.
6 Weighted Singleton Congestion Games
In this section, we consider the case of singleton weighted congestion games. In this class of games, for
every playeri, every strategysi ∈ Si contains a single facility only. As mentioned in Corollary 3.3, the
construction of the Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 3.2) is even valid for singleton games, establishing
that every set of cost functionsC that is consistent for singleton games may only contain monotonic
functions. It is well known, that singleton congestion games with weighted players and either only

















︸     ︷︷     ︸
sa1









2, x3) = (66, 2 · 80, 65)
π(xa1, x
b




2, x3) = (62, 2 · 81, 35)
γ
(b) Improvement cycleγ
Figure 3: (a) The players’ strategies and (b) the improvement cycleγ of the game constructed in Exam-
ple 5.5 that does not admit a PNE.
result for non-decreasing costs is established via a potential function, these games also possess the FIP.
With similar arguments it is not difficult to establish the FIP also for the case of non-increasingcosts.1
To the best of our knowledge it is open, whether singleton weight d congestion games with both non-
decreasing and non-increasing cost functions admit a PNE oreven the FIP. Regarding the existence of
PNE, fortwo-playergames, we will give a positive answer to this question.
Theorem 6.1. LetC be a set of continuous functions and letG2s(C) be the set of two-player games such
that cost functions are inC and strategy spaces are sets of singletons. Then,C is consistent forG2s(C) if
and only ifC contains only monotonic functions.
Proof. The “only if”-part follows from Corollary 3.3. LetF− andF+ denote the set of facilities with non-
increasing and non-decreasing costs, respectively. In order to obtain a partition ofF, let us introduce
the convention that facilities with constant cost functions are contained inF+ only. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that both player have access to allfacilities in F−, since we can replace the
cost function of every facility that is contained in the strategy space of only one player by a constant
function. We initialize the players both playingg, whereg = arg minf∈F− cf (d1 + d2). Clearly, no player
wants to deviate to a facilityh ∈ F−. If no player wants to switch to a facility inF+, we have already
reached an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, let us as umed1 < d2. If only player 2 wants to
switch to a facility f2 ∈ F+, we let player 2 deviate tof2 and then player 1 play a best replyf1. Since
player 1 did not want to deviate in the first place, we havef1 , f2 and thus, we have a reached a PNE.
So, we are left with the case that both players want to deviateto F+. We let player 1 move first to one
of her best repliesf1 ∈ F+. If player 2 does not want to deviate toF+ anymore, we are done. So let us
assume thatf2 ∈ F+ is a best reply of player 2 to (f1, g). If f1 , f2, we have reached an equilibrium, so
the only interesting case isf1 = f2. In that case, leth1 be a best reply of player 1 to (f1, f2). We claim
that (h1, f2) is a PNE. To see this, note thath1 , F− because otherwiseh1 would have been a best reply
of player 2 to (f1, g). Hence, player 2 does not want to deviate fromf2. 
1In fact, we can consider the functionφ that assigns to each strategy profile the non-decreasingly sorted vector of the
players’ private costs. It is easy to see, thatφ decreases lexicographically along any improvement path, es ablishing that every
such path is finite.
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(a) Cost functions in the game of Example 6.2
facility
costc(x)
x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
g 10 5 3
f1 2 2 9
f2 8 8 8
f3 1 7 7
f4 6 6 6
(b) Cost functions in the game of Example 6.3
facility
costc(x)
x = 1 x = 2 x = 3 x = 4 x = 5 x = 6
f 0 0 2 3 3 3
g 5 1 1 1 0 0
h 2 2 2 2 1 1
Table 1: (a) Cost functions of the five facilitiesg, f1, f2, f3, and f4 facilities in the game of Example 6.2;
(b) Cost functions of the three facilitiesf , g, andh in the game of Example 6.3.
π({g}, { f }, { f }) = (5, 6, 12) π({g}, {g}, { f }) = (1, 2, 12) π({g}, { f }, {h}) = (5, 0, 8) π({g}, {g}, {h}) = (1, 2, 8)
π({h}, { f }, { f }) = (2, 6, 12) π({h}, {g}, { f }) = (2, 2, 12) π({h}, { f }, {h}) = (4, 0, 16) π({h}, {g}, {h}) = (4, 2, 16)
Figure 4: Best reply graph of the singleton weighted congestion gameG(M) constructed in Example 6.3.
The vertical arcs correspond to best replies of player 1, thes raight horizontal arcs to best replies of
player 2 and the wide horizontal arcs to best replies of player 3. Since the graph does not have a sink,
the gameG(M) does not possess a PNE.
Two-player singleton weighted congestion games with monotonic costs need not possess the FIP as
shown in the following example.
Example 6.2. Consider the congestion modelM = (N, F,S, (cf ) f∈F) with two players N= {1, 2} who
have access to all five resources F= {g, f1, f2, f3, f4}. The facilities’ cost functions are shown in Table 1
(a). Note that the cost function of facility g is strictly decr asing while all other cost functions are non-
decreasing. The players’ demands are given by d1 = 1 and d2 = 2. It is not hard to verify that the cycleγ
defined asγ =
(
({g}, {g}), ({g}, { f1}), ({ f1}, { f1}), ({ f1}, { f2}), ({ f3}, { f2}), ({ f3}, { f3}), ({ f4}, { f3}), ({ f4}, {g}), ({g}, {g})
)
is an improvement cycle.
There are singleton games with three players and monotonic csts that not even possess a PNE as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 6.3.Consider the congestion modelM = (N, F,S, (cf ) f∈F) with N = {1, 2, 3} and F= { f , g, h}.
The used cost functions are given in Table 1 (b). We claim thatthe weighted congestion game G(M) =
(N,S, π) with S1 =
{{g}, {h}}, S2 =
{{ f }, {h}}, S3 =
{{ f }, {g}} and d1 = 1, d2 = 2, d3 = 4 does not admit
a PNE. To see this, note that the best-reply graph of G(M) shown in Figure 4 does not have a sink,
establishing that G(M) has no PNE.
However, we are able to give a positive result forsymmetricgames in which the players have access
to all facilities.
Theorem 6.4. Let C be a set of continuous functions and letGs,y(C) be the set games such that cost
functions are inC and strategy spaces are sets of singletons and equal for every player. Then,C is
consistent forGs,y(C) if and only ifC contains only monotonic functions.
Note that the only if part also follows from Corollary 3.3. Inorder to prove the if part, we give an
algorithm that efficiently computes a PNE in such games. In the following, we denote byF+ andF− the
set of facilities with non-decreasing and non-increasing costs, respectively. In order to obtain a partition
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Algorithm 1 : Computation of a PNE in symmetric singleton weighted congestion games.
Input : Symmetric singleton weighted congestion gameG.
Output : PNEsof G.
N− := N, N+ := ∅ ;1
Computeg := arg minf∈F− cf (
∑
i∈N− di) and setsi := {g} for all i ∈ N− ;2
if k = arg mini∈N− di can improve switching tof ∈ F+ then3
sk := f , N− := N− \ {k}, N+ := N+ ∪ {k} ;4





of F, we introduce the convention, that facilities with constant cost functions are contained inF+ only.
The algorithm that we propose (Algorithm 1) initializes allplayers on the facilityg ∈ F− that minimizes
cg(
∑
i∈N di). Clearly, no player then has an incentive to switch to another facility h ∈ F−. The key
observation is that, as long as there is at least one playeri ∈ N that wants to switch to a facilityf ∈ F+,
also the player with smallest demand does so. So we iteratively ake the player with smallest weight on
g and let her move toF+. Then, we compute a sequence of best replies of the players onF+ in order to
assure that none of them has an incentive to deviate to another facility in F+. Also, the players onF− are
placed on the facility minimizingcf (
∑
i∈N:si∈F− di). Since we can prove that a player onF+ never wants
to move back to a facility inF−, this process stops after a polynomial number of best-replysteps.
Lemma 6.5. Algorithm 1 computes a PNE in polynomial time.
Proof. Let us first remark that the computation of the PNE of playersN+ on F+ in line 4 finishes after
a polynomial sequence of best replies since the cost functions of the facilities inF+ are non-decreasing,
see [1, 21]. As at mostn times such PNE is computed, the algorithm terminates after apolynomial
number of best-reply steps.
Let z denote the outcome of the algorithm. Clearly, no playerj ∈ N+ can improve switching to
another facilityf ∈ F+ since we always recompute a PNE in line 4. Also, no playerj ∈ N− can improve
unilaterally deviating to another facilityf ∈ F− sincecf (d j) ≥ cf (
∑
i∈N− di) ≥ cg(
∑
i∈N− di). In addition,
we know that playerk = arg mini∈N− di does not improve switching from facilityg to another facility
f ∈ F+. In consequence, the same holds for every other playerj ∈ N− since the cost for her on a facility
f ∈ F+ are not smaller. Finally, it is left to show that inz no player j ∈ N+ has an interest to switch to
some facility f ∈ F−.
To prove this result, letit, t = 1, . . . ,T, T ∈ N denote the player that switches fromgt ∈ F− to
ft ∈ F+ in the t-th iteration of the algorithm and let ˜zt andzt denote the corresponding strategy profiles




t) + dit ) > max
f∈F+:ℓ f (zt)>0
cf (ℓ f (z
t)) for all t = 1, . . . ,T. (8)
For t = 1, the statement holds true, since playeri1 improves switching fromF− to F+. Now, suppose (8)
holds true fort − 1. In thet-th iteration, playerit changes her strategy fromgt ∈ F− to some facility ft ∈
F+. In consequence, ming∈F− cg(ℓg(z


















> cf (ℓ f (zt−1)) for all f ∈ F+ with ℓ f (zt−1) > 0.









> maxf∈F+:ℓ f (zt−1)>0 cf (ℓ f (z̃
t)). Since the maximum cost onF+ cannot increase in




> maxf∈F+:ℓ f (zt)>0 cf (ℓ f (z
t))
as claimed.
Because the algorithm moves always the player with the currently smallest weight fromF− to F+
(line 3) it holds thatdiT = maxi∈N+ di which gives ming∈F− cg
(
ℓg(z) + di






maxf∈F+ cf (ℓ f (z̃)) for all i ∈ N+. Thus, no playeri ∈ N+ has an incentive to switch to a facilityg ∈
F−. 
Remark 6.6. In contrast to the characterizations given in Theorems 4.3 and 5.3, the results of Theo-
rems 6.1 and 6.4 do not require differentiability of cost functions.
7 Weighted Network Congestion Games
In this section, we discuss the implications of our characteizations to the important subclass of weighted
network congestion games. In these games, the facilities correspond to edges of a directed or undirected
graph. Every player is associated with a positive demand that she wants to route from her origin to her
destination on a path of minimum cost. We consider in the following only directed networks.
Our characterization of consistent cost functions given inTheorem 5.3 crucially relies on the con-
struction used in the Extended Monotonicity Lemma. By assuming that cost functions are positive, we
can transform this construction to a weighted network congestion game as illustrated in Figure 5. We
obtain the following result.
Theorem 7.1. LetC be a non-empty set of positive and twice continuously differentiable functions and
let Gmc(C) be the set of multi-commodity network games such that cost func ions are inC. Then, the
following are equivalent:
1. C is consistent forGmc(C).
2. C is FIP-consistent forGmc(C).
3. C contains only affine functionsor C contains only functions of type c(x) = ac eφ x + bc, where
ac, bc ∈ Rmay depend on c whileφ ∈ R is independent of c.
Proof. Consider the network in Figure 5 (a). We have three players repres nted by the three source-
terminal pairs (si , ti), i = 1, . . . , 3. The set of strategies for every player are the respective sets of (si , ti)-
paths. By adding sufficiently many edges in series to the shortcut pathQ (and using that cost functions
are positive), we ensure that player 1 will use in any PNE onlythe two pathsP11 = (s1, v1, v2, v3, t3, t1)
and P21 = (s1, s3, v6, v7, v8, t1). These two paths contain either all edges inF1 and F2, or all edges
in F3 and F4. Similarly, player 2 will only use the two pathsP12 = (s2, v1, v2, s3, v6, t2) and P
2
2 =
(s2, v3, t3, v7, v8, t2), which contain either all edges inF1 andF3 or all edges inF2 andF4. The third
player is an offset player and only has a single strategy: the pathP3 = (s3, v6, v3, t3).
Now, in order to apply the same arguments as in the Extended Monotonicity Lemma, we observe






















, all edges not in
∪4i=1Fi cancel out. We, thus, obtain that every function inL
3
N
(C) must be monotonic. 
Remark 7.2. In games with negative costs the players strive to establishlong paths. In this case, our
construction does not work since e.g. player 2 prefers to take he detourv6 → v7 → v8 → t2 instead of
the edgev6→ t2.
If the cost functions contained inC are strictly increasing, we can actually strengthen the above
result to two-commodity network games with three players bymerging player 1 and 2 using a super
source and a super sink. For single- or multi-commodity weight d network games with two players, we
obtain the following.
Theorem 7.3. LetC be a non-empty set of strictly increasing, positive, and twice continuously differen-
tiable functions and letG2mc(C) be the set of two-player (single or two)-commodity network games such
that cost functions are inC. Then, the following two conditions are equivalent.
1. C is consistent forG2mc(C).
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(a) Multi-commodity network instance
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(b) Single-commodity network instance
Figure 5: (a) Multi-commodity network instance and (b) single-commodity network instance for the
proofs of Theorem 7.1, Theorem 7.3 and Corollary 7.4.
2. C is FIP-consistent forG2mc(C).
3. For all c1, c2 ∈ C, there are constants a, b ∈ R with c1(x) = a c2(x) + b for all x ∈ R≥0.
Proof. For two-commodity networks, we use the same construction asi the proof of Theorem 7.1,
except that we omit the offset player.
For single-commodity networks, we also use the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 7.1,
except that we omit the offset player and merge player 1 and 2 with a super-source and a super- ink as
illustrated in Figure 5 (b). Note that we omit the connectionfrom s to s3 and t3 to t in Figure 5 (b).
The super-source and sink are connected to the respective nodess1, s2, t1, t2 with sufficiently long paths.
Since the cost functions are strictly increasing, in a PNE, player one and two will not share any of
these paths. Moreover, in the proof of the Extended Monotonicity Lemma it is immaterial whether the
strategies of players one and two are exchanged, thus, the claimed result follows. 
For single-commodity network games with three or more players we are not able to characterize
consistency of cost functions. Our previous idea of introducing sufficient long paths connecting the
super-sources to the sourcess1, s2, s3 and the sinkst1, t2, t3 to the sinkt as shown in Figure 5 (b),
does cannot exclude the existence of a PNE. In fact, there might be a PNE in which player 3 uses one
of the pathsP̃11 = (s, s1, v1, v2, v3, t3, t1, t), P̃
2
1 = (s, s1, s3, v6, v7, v8, t1, t), P̃
1
2 = (s, s2, v1, v2, s3, v6, t2, t)




2, P̃3) where P̃3 =
(s, s3, v6, v3, t3, t) we can show that for every non-affine and non-exponential cost functions, an improve-
ment cycle exists. We thus conclude with the following result concerning the Finite Improvement Prop-
erty.
Corollary 7.4. LetC be a non-empty set of strictly increasing, positive and twice continuously differ-
entiable functions and letGsc(C) be the set of single-commodity network games such that cost functions
are inC. Then, the following are equivalent:
1. C is FIP-consistent forGsc(C).
2. C contains only affine functionsor C contains only functions of type c(x) = ac eφ x + bc where
ac, bc ∈ Rmay depend on c whileφ ∈ R is independent of c.
Remark 7.5. Some authors regard network congestion games in which some of the edges may be
forbidden to a subset of players, see for instance the work ofMilchtaich [26]. If we regard this more
general class of games, we can establish the results of Theorems 7.1 and 7.3 as well as Corollary 7.4




We obtained a characterization of the equilibrium existence problem in weighted congestion games with
respect to the facilities’ cost functions. The following issues have not been resolved. We required
for our characterizations that cost functions are twice continuously differentiable. Although almost all
practically relevant functions satisfy this condition, itwould be interesting to weaken this assumption.
Some of our characterizations for network games require that cost functions are positive and strictly
increasing. Moreover, for single-commodity games with at le st three players, we were only able to
characterize the FIP, not consistency. The single-commodity case, however, behaves completely different
as, for instance, Anshelevich et al. [5] have shown that for positive and strictly decreasing cost functions,
there is always a PNE. Finally, it would be interesting to characterize consistency of cost functions for
undirected networks.
Acknowledgments
We thank Hans-Christian Kreusler for fruitful discussions. The research of the second author was sup-
ported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft within the res a ch training group ‘Methods for Dis-
crete Structures’ (GRK 1408).
References
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